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THE SIMLA CONVENTION 1914: 
A CHINESE PUZZLE 
I -NIRMAL C. SINHA 
Among the important events of 1914 is the Simla Convention dated the 
3rd July 1914. Three parties participated in a conference in Simla which 
ended in a tripartite agreement in draft form .in March-April 1914. The 
three parties were India, China and Til:lel 
Mter the draft agreement was ready, disputes between China and Tibet 
cropped up on two points : (1) the borders between China and Tibet and (2) the 
degree and nature of Chinese suzerainty over the Dalai Lama's government. 
These disputes were not solved in protracted consultations through the SUIll-
mer months of 1914. The British and the Tibetan delegates even then wanted 
to sign and ratify the draft agreed previously. The Chinese delegate, Ivan 
Chen, refused to sign and wanted further authorization from Peking for signa-
ture. Ivan Chen walked out of the conference on 3rd July 1914 and pro-
ceeded to Calcutta en route to China. The British and Tibetan delegates 
signed the agreement and by further affirmative documents ratified the Con-
vention as binding between the British Government in India and the Dalai 
Lama's Government in Tibet. Though the original draft for the agreement 
describing the three parties and detailing the rights and privileges of the three 
parties was retained, a declaration was added that China would not be 
entitled to any rights and privileges as a suzerain power in Tibet if she failed 
to sign or ratify the tripartite agreement. 
The war of 1914 followed the Simla Convention in a matter of weeks and 
since Great Britain and China were on the same side as allies,. neitl~er Great 
Britain nor China made any positive declarations about China's rights and 
privileges outside the Simla Convention. China, however. informally ques-
tioned the validity of the Simla Convention, but never pressed the point for 
clarification. The same position was continued later by KMT China. During 
the Second World War, China would more often refer to the provisions of 
the Simla Convention and put pressure on the Allies, .particularly, Britain 
and America, for recognition of China's suzerainty over Tibet. The question 
of borders between India and Tibet was not pressed so much. The British 
Prime Minister, .Winston Churchill, was even persuaded to make a statement 
at the Pacific Council in Washington (May 1943) that ·'no one contests the 
Chinese suzerainty in Tibet". The British Foreign Office did not find this 
statement of the British P.M. to be wrong. But their subordinates in the 
Government oflndia, namely, the British officials in the Indian Civil Service, 
pointed out in secret communications to Anthony Eden, the British ·Foreign 
Minister, that China had no rights in Tibet unless China signed. or otherwise 
accepted the provisions about Sino-Tibetan relations in the Simla Convention. 
In short, according to the British Officers in India, China could not have 
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unqualified control over Tibet without any proper treaty or agreement between 
Tibet and China. This point of view could not be altogether rejected by the 
British Foreign Office and shortly afterwards (July 1943) Anthony Eden made 
a statement in answer to Chinese request for clarification, that the Chinese 
suzerainty in Tibet was conditional and in no case unlimited. At the end of 
the war, KMT China again raised this question and was given hearing in the 
Press outside China simply because China had been admitted into the club 
of the Four Great Powers which destroyed the three Axis Powers (Germany, 
Italy and Japan). In 1947 March, an Asian Relations Conference was held 
in New Delhi. There were delegations from different Asian countries which 
included the Moslell'\ republics of USSR and Tibet. In the conference hall 
was a big map of Asia which depicted Tibet as quite separate from China. 
The delegates from China protested against the presence of Tibetan delegates 
as a distinct group and the map of Asia as on the wall of the conference room. 
The map had to be rem:)Ve::i though the Tibetan delegates continued. Ever 
since that event, the Chinese point of view about Tibet and about the Simla 
Convention has been circulating wider and wider and; when the People's 
Republic of China took over from the corrupt KMT regime, the former also 
took over all the antique claims of China about neighbouring countries. 
An important claim was based on the Chinese objection to the Simla 
Convention. 
The Government of India did not care to assess the implications of Chinese 
claims, and, on the other hand, were too friendly towards China as a country 
which was the victim of Western imperialism as much as India. Thus in 
1954 when India made a fresh treaty about trade and pilgrimage in Tibet, the 
Government of India, deliberately or carelessly, ignored the Simla Conven-
tion as Ha relic of British imperialism". The Simla Convention and the docu-
ments attached to this agreement not only provided for trade and pilgrimage 
but also laid down the frontiers between India and Tibet in the east. This 
frontier is the so-called McMahon Line named after Sir Arthur Henry Mc-
Mahon who was the chief delegate of the British government and was also 
the Chairman of the Tripartite Conference. Years later, when China dis-
puted India's northern borders both in the east and in the west and when the 
Government of India referred to the eastern border as finally settled in 'the 
Simla Conference, China simply refused to acknowledge the validity or lega-
lity"'of the Simla Convention. China indirectly demanded to know why India 
had not referred to the Simla Convention or the McMahon Line in the Sino-
Indian Agreement of 1954. . 
II 
The Simla Convention has' been criticised on several grounds: (I) a 
tripartite agreement signd by two parties is invalid ab initio; (2) the Simla 
Convention was not signed by the Tibetan delegate; (3) the Simla Convention 
was merely initialled by the British and Tibetan delegates; and (4) Tibet had 
no right to sign the agreement when China had walked out. 
We now reply to these arguments one by one. 
(1) A tripartite agreement signed by two parties is not necessarily in-
valid ab initio. If there is. nothing repugnant or contradictory in the text 
of a tripartite agreement, such agreement is flllly enforceable between two 
Si',:llory parties so far as the liabilities and rights of the two partie~ are 
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concerned. In the text of the Simla Convention the rights and liabilities of the 
two parties are very clearly stated ; and the fact of third party having left the 
~onference table could not and did not affect the position of the other two 
parties. 
(2) The Simla Convention was signed by the Tibetan delegate even 
though the Chinese delegate advised . the Tibetan delegate not to proceed 
further. The contention of the Tibetan delegate was that Tibet was represented 
at the Simla Conference on Tibet's own rights as a treaty-making state. 
Tibet did not come to the conference as a subordinate and subsidiary authority 
under the new Republic of China. Therefore Tibet had the right to sign or 
refuse to sign an agreement on Tibet's own jurisdiction. The full signature 
of Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan delegate, is on the Simla Agreement for any-
body's inspection even in 1974. 
(3) It is true that the British plenipotentiary, Sir Arthur Henry 
McMahon, put his initials-A.H.M.-and desired that the Tibetan pJeni-
potentiary should also put his initials in Tibetan. But since initalling is not 
only difficult but also impolite in Tibetan usage, the Tibetan plenipotentiary 
Lonchen Shatra put his full signature, describing his lineage even. After the 
signature, the British delegate put a note : initial and added at the bottom 
"owing to it not being possible to write initials in Tibetan, the mark of the 
Lonchen at this place is his signature", This was to ensure that the two 
signatories should follow one uniform pra9tice. Why the British wanted 
initials in place of signature is a quite different matter which is discussed later. 
Here it is only noted that uniformity in the procedure of signature is very 
much obligatory in treaties and agreements between two or more countries. 
Initials can very much be good substitute for signature if followed by the 
seal of the country concerned. And, in fact, in a rule regarding interpretation 
of conventions much later, the League of Nations had given its considered 
judgement that initials could be as much valid 'as full signatures in documents 
and treaties. [Geneva Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 12(2)] 
The British delegate was asking for the initials for the simple reason that 
the Chinese delegate was also asked to put his initials and to report to Peking 
for ratification. The Chinese delegate, Ivan Chen, was perhaps in the earlier 
stage inclined to adopt this procedure, but later with the opening of the month 
of July, he could smell sulphur in the atmosphere and he very much antici-
pated that the British would be involved in a war with Germany before the 
month was out and, therefore, the British who happened to be patrons of the 
Chinese Republic, would not much bother about this. However, it became an 
obsession later on with the Chinese authorities during the KMT period when 
they could not re-establish their suzerainty over Tibet, After World War II, 
pro-Chinese scholars in Britain took over this obsession with initials. A 
brilliant young scholar, Alstair Lamb, straightway rejected the authority of 
initials and conveniently ignoring the Geneva Convention on the Law of 
Treaties wrote a number of research papers on the Simla Convention and 
later on produced the famous book called The McMahon Line (1966). In 
this book as well as in his earlier papers, he consistently spelt "initialed" for 
"initialled", His first publications were from England and the spelling with 
single 'I' was undoubtedly most un-English. Lamb insisted on spelling like 
this to condemn the whole affair of initialling. When his famous MaMahon 
Line in two volumes came out from North America there was justficatiori 
for this American spelling. Meanwhile, much mischief has been caused to the 
claims of both India and Tibet by this argument ab,out initials. The argument, 
unfortunately, was followed by many scholars in Indian universities. 
(4) Thus we come to the only positive argument against the Simla Con-
vention that Tibet had no right to sign independent of China or in the absence 
of China. In fact, this is the only argument which has been officially advanced 
by the People's Republic of China. It is a mark of Chinese diplomacy that in 
their non-official publications as also in the writings of sponsored scholars, 
the legality of the signature is not much discussed. There is a heavy and 
noisy propaganda in the non-official and demi-official writings that the treaty 
was not signed at all and that initials were not good enough to make these as 
strong as signatures. Some scholars, later on, had even made researches to 
prove that the Simla Convention being not properly signed and ratified be-
tween India and Tibet, was later on put into cold storage in the British Foreign 
Office and that a considerable section of opinion in the British Foreign Office 
considered the Simla Convention as dead and defunct. Interesting side-
lights on this point can be found in Neville Maxwell's India's China War (1970). 
In Chinese official statements, they admit thaUhe Simla Convention was 
signed by the Tibetan delegate. But they reject the right of the Tibetan 
delegate to sign or ratify such an agreement without authority from Peking. 
The most important document is found in the Indian White Paper containing 
the Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the People's Re-
public of China on the Boundary Question (New Delhi, 1961) and in the Chinese 
Red Paper containing Report of the Officials of the Government of the People's 
Republic of China and the Government of India on the Boundary nl./~stion, 
(Peking n.d.-1962). 
"Premier Chou En-lai and Chinese officials do not deny the fact that the 
then Tibet local representative signed the Simla Convention; but that they 
have always clearly pointed out at the same time that this is illegal and that 
Tibet has no right to conclude treaties separately." [Indian White Pape 
page CR 26; Chinese Red Paper, page 30.} 
IIi 
In the 1930s when the Government of India was revising and bringing 
up to date the official pUblication known as Aitchison's Treaties and Engage-
ments, during the first stage of compilation the Simla Convention was drop-
ped. This was because the British Government in India, under informal 
instructions of the Home Government, i.e., the British Foreign Office, was 
out to pamper China and fondly expected China to come to the conference 
table and sign the Simla Convention. The Republic of China was faciIig 
systematic invasions frem Japan and it was in the interests of British Power 
in Asia to prop up the weak and corrupt RepUblic. The British were even 
willing to let China come back to Tibet as the suzerain Power and this could 
be possible only if China signed the Simla Convention. 
While waiting for China's ratification or signature was no doubt good 
diplomacy, the fact of the Simla Convention between India and Tibet could 
not be ignored without serious consequences. The two signatory parties, 
India and Tibet, were carrying on trade and pilgrimage under the terms of 
the Simla Convention; and if the agreement was defunct, all transactions 
between India and Tibet would be illegal. Besides, on~ solid gain out of the 
8 
Simla conference, that is, the affirmation Qf the customary boundary between 
India dnd Tibet· in the east, would be lost. Therefore, British officials in 
India, particularly, Olaf Car'oe and Hugh Richardson, advised strongly for 
the inclusion of the Simla Convention in the forthcoming edition of Aitchison's 
Treaties. The relevant volume had, however, been printed off. The print was 
called back and a fresh print made in which the Simla Convention and the 
connected documents were included. There was nothing secret in this matter. 
Besides British officials, Indian and Tibetan officials on either side knew about it. 
In the 1960's the pro-Chinese scholars of Britain and India made much 
out of the fact of the cancelled print of Aitchison's Treaties: relevant volume. 
In 1969-70, Neville Maxwell raised a hue and cry over this affair which, in the 
words of Maxwell and his Indian friends, came to be described variously as 
"mysterious", "conspiratorial", "afterthought", "fraudulent", "fake", and 
even "spurious". Now the whole matter boils down to a tempest in a teapot 
when we remember that the People's Republic of China and that Prime Minister 
Chou En-lai, have officially, on several occasions, admitted not only the exis-
tence of the Simla Convention as a signed document but also that Tibet had 
signed the agreement. It is therefore, not necessary to argue further whether 
the Simla Convention was a 'fraud", "fake" or "spurious". 
When the new generation of British scholars, like Alastair Lamb and 
Neville Maxwell, speak about the imperialistic designs of British officials in 
Asia and name Olaf Caroe and Hugh Richardson as imperialists there is a 
touch of the British sense of justice in the researches of the new generation. 
The Indian scholars are easily misled to accept the researches and conclusions 
of Lamb or Maxwell as innocent protests. The Indian scholars are yet to 
realize that Lamb and Maxwell are also Britons and they may also have their 
interests in creating further discord and disagreement between India and 
China. 
The truth of the matter lies in the uncomfortable fact of Tibet's claims 
to independence. If Tibet could sign an agreement in July 1914, Tibet was 
no doubt an independent country on that day. The scholars as well as diplo-
mats of the People's Republic of China very much want the agreement to be 
accepted as a document of history but a document with "illegal signature". 
It serves the cause of China as the suzerain Power if China's contention is 
admitted by India that Tibet signed the document without any authority or 
jurisdiction. Thus even if Sir Olaf Caroe from his retirement or the late Sir 
Arthur Henry McMahon from his grave would come to New Delhi or Pek.ing 
and say that the Simla Convention was not a fact, the People's Republic of 
China will call it a fact of history. In short, if the Simla Convention is legal, 
it serves the cause of Tibet; if the Simla Convention is illegal, it serves the 
cause of China. 
From this one can easily notice the great diplomatic blunder on the part 
of the Government of India, when in 1954 India surrendered all special rights 
and privileges in the Tibet Region of China without referring to the document 
under which the Republic of India was enjoying these special rights and pri-
vileges as the successor to the British empire in India. Indian scholars toeing 
the line of Lamb and Maxwell condone the crime by denying the historic 
fact of the Simla Convention. And our. eastern Himalayan frontiers called 
the McMahon Line are disputed by ~e new generation of British scholars 
professing to atone for the sins of their forbears; a profession which no doubt 




This article (supra pp.5-9); written in 1974, was within prescribed space 
limits. Some facts about the Simla Convention 1914 as a lawful instrument of 
international relations may be added now for ready reference of the general 
reader. 
The Convention along with the Trade Regulations, both signed on 3 July 
1914 at Simla, entitled British Government of India to extra-territorial rights 
in Tibet. These rights may be summed as three: (j) atmed escorts (of British or 
British Indian troops) for the British Trade Agents in Tibet; (jj) the telegraph lines 
from Indian frontier to the Trade Agencies/Marts as also the carriage and trans-
port of posts to and from the Indian frontier owned and operated by the Govern-
ment of India; and (iii) all cases regarding property or person between British 
subjects within jurisdiction of British Trade Agents as also some cases involving 
British subjects as defendants. 
These British rights in Tibet conti~ed till 1947 when such rights passed 
to the succeeding state of independent India. Dominion of India and later Republic 
of India exercised these rights till 1954. 
In the Notes exchanged on 29 April 1954 at peking immediately after the 
India-China Agreement was signed it was "agreed between the two governments 
as follows." 
"( 1) The Government of India will be pleased to withdraw completely 
within six (6) months from the date of exchange of the present notes the military 
escorts now stationed at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet Region of China. The 
Government of China will render facilities and assistance in such withdrawal." 
"( 2) The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Govern-
ment of China at a reasonable price the postal, teleg,'aph and public telephone 
services together with their equipment operated by the Government of India in 
Tihet Region of China. The concrete measures in this regard will be decided upon 
through further negotiations between the Indian Embassy in China and the Foreign 
Ministry of China, which shall start immediately after the exchange of the present 
notes." 
11(3) The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Govern-
ment of China at a reasonable price the twelve (12) rest houses of the Government 
of India in Tibet Region of China. The concrete measures in this regard will 
be decided upon through further negotiations between the Indian Embassy in China 
and the foreign Ministry of China, which shall sta.rt immediately after the ex-
change of the present notes. The Government of China agrees that they shall 
continue as rest houses." 
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"(6) The Trade Agents of both parties may, in accordanc~ with ~he lawl> 
and regulations of the local governments, have access to their nationals Involved 
in civil or criminal cases." 
"(15) DisPllres--between traders of both countr.ies o,~er debts and claims 
shall be handled in accordance with loca~ laws\8nd regulations. 
P ( 1) (2) 0) (6) and (15).of the Notes Exchanged on 29 April 1954 ar as , , , . T"b t th 
testify that India was in full enjoyment of extra-territorial rights In I ~ on e 
date. These rights were detailed and guaranteed in the Simla Conv~mtlon 1914 
(and the Trade Regulations dated same, i.e. Simla 3 July 1914). 
In the following three decades, China on several occasions questioned the 
Convention's validity just to revive China's claims to suzerainty over Tibet. Britain 
was willing to admit Chinese suzerainty over Tibet if China would accept the 
Simla Convention provision relating,to Sino-Tibetan borders as well as Tibetan 
Government's autonomy within Tibet. China would not agree and the Convention 
continued as valid between Britain and Tibet. 
Though Britain was all out to pamper China as one of (he four Allies 
in the war against the Axis Powers, Tibel was in no mood to compromise its inde-
pendence to suit China's war efforts. The advisers around the minor Dalai Lama 
(born 1935' consecrated 1940) refused to declare Tibet belligerent on the side of 
Britain and China; Tibet pursued strict neutrality not unlike Ireland. Even overland 
supply lines, from Anglo-American b~ses in India to Chinese bases in the mainland, 
II/Bre not permitted because Tibet was not a Chinese territory. 
an 11 January 1943 at Chungking, Britain signed away all the extra-
territorial.rilqhts in "all the territories of the Republic of China". The Chungking 
Treaty did not abrogate British extra-territorial rights in Tibet because Tibet was 
not a Chinese teriircily.far from being an oversight, the exclusion of British right 
in Tibet from the pur view of Chungking Treaty was deliberate and calculated. 
To placataChina, Britian could have mentioned Tibet as a region of China and 
yet excluded British rights in Tibet from the operative clauses of the treaty. 
This was not done for the simple reason.tha~ Tibet's independence was defecto 
cumdejure. 
The Simla Convention, guaranteeing India's extra-territorial rights in Tibet 
and confirming the frontier between India and Tibet in the east, was thus operative 
t ill the end of April 1954. The frontier so con11rmed was the traditional frontier 
along the crest of the Himalayas from the northaast corner of Bhutan to. the Isu 
Razi pass in the north of B!Jrma. It came ta be called Mc Mahon line, because 
Arthur Henry Mc Mahon, the British Plenipotentiary and Chairman of the Simla 
Conference, had marked on the map the finally accepted line with his pencil. 
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Finalization of this Line was made on 24/25 March 1914 by the two concerned 
parties, BI itiSh Plenipotentiary U\.H.Mc Mahon) and Tibetan Plenipotentiary 
(Lonchen Shatra). On being informed later Chinese Plenipotentiary (Ivan Chen) 
did not express any disagreement. All Chinese disagreements and their eventual 
withdrawal from the Simla Conference concerned the Sino-Tibetan borders and 
Tibetan autonomy. 
The map depicting M,c Mahon Line with the signatures of all Plenipoten-
tiaries is found in An Atlas of the Northern Frontier of India (Govern-
ment of India 1960). The Chinese concepts of 'suzerainty' or 'tribute' will be found 
in FAIRBANK(J.K.) and TENG (S.Y.): On the Ching Tributary System in Harvard 
OrientalJournal 1941 and SINHA (N.C.): ASianLawandUsag~inEuropean 
Expression in Man in India 1966. 
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